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DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN RE-CHARGING DEFENDANTS:
PEARCE TO BLACKLEDGE TO BORDENKIRCHER
DONALD C. SMALTZ*
Within the past decade, federal courts have begun to circumscribe the
traditionally unfettered discretion of the prosecutor to bring an additional
charge against a defendant, where it appears that the extra charge is
brought in retaliation for the defendant's exercise of a procedural right.' A
criminal defendant is entitled to pursue his constitutional and statutory
rights free of prosecutorial threats and intimidation. A fear of prosecutorial
retaliation or vindictiveness may chill a defendant's exercise of these
rights, and may amount to a violation of due process of law.
2
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions have established
that when the institution of an additional charge against a defendant upon
retrial may be perceived by the defendant as retaliation for his assertion
of a legal right, principles of due process are violated.3 Thus, if the govern-
* Member, Smaltz & Neelley, Los Angeles, Calif.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Southwest-
ern Univ. School of Law; B.A., 1958, Pennsylvania State Univ.; J.D., 1961, Dickinson School
of Law; Member Pennsylvania and California Bars. The author wishes to express his appre-
ciation to Robert L. Hess, an associate with Smaltz & Neelley, for his valuable assistance in
editing this article.
This article is based on materials prepared by the author for the A.B.A."s National
Institute on Parallel Grand Jury and agency Investigations: The Criminal and Civil Implica-
tions for Corporations and Their Officers (1978).
1 The charging power of the executive has been circumscribed in a variety of contexts
which are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)
(exercise of the prosecutor's charging power may not be "based upon an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582, 588 (1961) (a defense to a criminal proceeding may be that ". . . any such proceed-
ing .. .is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination .. ..);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (impermissible discrimination against Chinese
violated the equal protection clause); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 1973)
(prosecution of defendant for failure to carry draft card when Justice Department policy was
not to prosecute for that offense amounted to denial of equal protection and infringement of
the rights of speech and expression); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
1972) (discrimination found in indicting defendant who refused to answer questions in a
census report); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (4th Cir. 1972) (discrimi-
nation in indicting defendant on charge of disorderly conduct abridged defendant's freedom
of speech and expression).
2 The fifth amendment provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury ...nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment states in part:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, see. 1.
3 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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ment has knowledge of multiple offenses or offenses of different severity
at the time of the original indictment, it cannot "up the ante" after the
assertion of rights by charging additional or more serious offenses than
those originally brought.4 In another recent decision, however, the Su-
preme Court has held that principles of due process are not violated when,
during plea negotiations, a prosecutor legitimately threatens reindictment
and trial on a more serious offense in order to induce the defendant to plead
guilty to the offense with which he was first charged. 5
In North Carolina v. Pearce,' and Blackledge v. Perry,7 the Supreme
Court established the constitutional principle that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed to
pursue his rights free of any apprehension of retaliation by the substitution
or addition of a more serious charge. Prosecutorial charging decisions are
particularly closely scrutinized where an increase or substitution of charges
is or appears to be motivated by a defendant's refusal to waive a procedural
or constitutional right.8 Thus, a finding that the additional or more serious
charges are based upon conduct known by the government to have criminal
ramifications when the initial charges were brought is the operative fact
which condemns the new allegations.? Only where an event occurs between
the first and second indictments, which on its face negates the appearance
of retaliation, will a charge increase be condoned. After-the-fact rationali-
zations are insufficient to justify the additional charges when the govern-
ment's action smacks of vindictiveness. It is the very appearance of vindic-
tiveness, not simply express retaliation, which the courts proscribe.'0
A major exception to the Pearce/Blackledge rule was carved out in the
context of plea bargaining by the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes." In Bordenkircher, the Court held that during plea negotiations a
prosecutor may threaten a defendant with indictment for a more serious
offense if the defendant refused to plead guilty to a lesser offense with
which he was initially charged." While somewhat of a retreat from
Pearce/Blackledge, Bordenkircher applies only in the limited context of
pretrial negotiations where the prosecutor has probable cause to file the
more serious charges. The narrow scope of the Bordenkircher exception
See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974); see, e.g., United States v. Jamison,
505 F.2d 407, 413-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
7 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
1 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 492,
499-500 (1978) (state statute making life imprisonment mandatory if defendant is convicted
by a jury of first degree murder not an unconstitutional burden on a defendant's rights when
a plea of non vult to the same offense may result in a lesser sentence).
I E.g., United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978); see United States v.
Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (4th Cir. 1976).
10 E.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d
450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
" 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
,2 Id. at 365.
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was entirely misconstrued, however, by the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Litton Systems, Inc. 3 Mechanically applying the result in Bor-
denkircher, the Litton court disregarded the district judge's finding of
actual retaliation, the government's admitted lack of probable cause to
indict, and the prophylactic principles of Pearce/Blackledge.14 The court
of appeals thus placed its stamp of approval on serious prosecutorial mis-
conduct. Despite the Litton decision, the lower courts generally have given
broad meaning to the constitutional principle of due process and the
ethical obligations of the prosecutor in determining what charges to
file against defendants.
I. DEVELOPmENT OF THE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
A central maxim of American jurisprudence is that neither the prose-
cutor, nor the judge, nor the legislature may abrogate the constitutional
rights guaranteed a defendant. Although the Constitution does not forbid
requiring a defendant to choose from among the rights available to him, 5
if the "purpose or effect" of a statute or procedure is "to chill the assertion
of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them,"
that result is "patently unconstitutional." 6
The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of vindictiveness in North
Carolina v. Pearce. 17 Pearce involved the constitutionality of the imposi-
tion of a sentence by a judge' upon conviction after retrial where the
13 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 101 (1978).
" See text accompanying notes 126-62 infra.
" See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 756-57 (1970).
1" United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (statute permitting imposition of
death penalty only upon recommendation of jury had chilling effect on exercise of fifth and
sixth amendment rights).
17 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
11 In Pearce, the Supreme Court rejected equal protection and double jeopardy attacks,
but set forth the requirement that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a
defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear." 395 U.S.
at 726.
Sentencing by a judge, as in Pearce, is to be contrasted with jury sentencing which was
present in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Distinguishing the potential for
judicial vindictiveness, which explicitly underlay Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-26, the Chaffin
Court found that the likelihood of retaliatory or vindictive sentencing by a jury was "de
minimis in a properly controlled retrial." 412 U.S. at 26. Where the jury is not aware of the
sentence previously imposed, and not concerned with vindicating a sentence imposed in the
first trial, there is no real threat of vindictiveness. Thus, the due process concerns of Pearce
are not implicated. Id. at 25-28.
Although extended discussion of judicial retaliation or vindictiveness is beyond the scope
of this article, Pearce demonstrates that the due process principles extend to bar the appear-
ance of judicial vindictiveness. For example, in United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973), the Ninth Circuit vacated a sentence imposed after
trial where the district judge had told the defendant that a shorter sentence would be imposed
if he would plead guilty and avoid a trial. Citing Pearce, the court held that the trial court's
sentencing power may not be used as punishment for a defendant's refusal to plead guilty.
19791
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sentence was harsher than that imposed following the original conviction.
The defendant was originally convicted of assault with intent to commit
rape and received a prison term of 12 to 15 years. This conviction was
reversed when the North Carolina Supreme Court found his confession to
have been involuntary. Upon retrial he was again convicted, receiving a
sentence of eight years imprisonment. This second sentence, when added
to the time Pearce had already spent in prison, amounted to approximately
three years more than the sentence originally imposed. In a habeas corpus
proceeding, the federal district court found the sentence impermissible,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a major-
ity of the Supreme Court, identified the major issue in the case as being
"what constitutional limitations there may be upon the general power of
a judge to impose upon reconviction a longer prison sentence than the
defendant originally received."'"
Observing that it would be a flagrant violation of the fourteenth
amendment if a state trial court had an announced policy of imposing more
severe sentences upon defendants who successfully attack their convic-
tions, the Court found that an unexplained increase in punishment in these
circumstances violated the due process clause:
"[Clourts must not use the sentencing power as a carrot and stick to clear congested calen-
dars, and they must not create an appearance of such a practice." Id. at 1187.
Two years later, in a case involving resentencing after a revocation of probation, the
Ninth Circuit again vacated a sentence imposed because the record did not "affirmatively
show that the court resentenced the defendant 'solely upon the facts of his case and his
personal history' . . . and not to punish him for asserting his legal rights." United States v.
Kenyon, 519 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 (1975). The court held that
due process "requires that corrective resentencing be free of vindictiveness, pique, or the
appearance thereof." Id.
The continuing nature of the problem of judicial retaliation is well illustrated by the
California Supreme Court's recent decision In re Lewallen, 23 Cal.3d 274, 590 P.2d, 383, 152
Cal. Rptr. 528 (1979). See also Ramsey v. New York, 401 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. Sup. Ct.),
cert. dismissed as improvidentially granted, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
Other cases which have utilized the rationale of Pearce include Midgett v. McClelland,
547 F.2d 1194, 1197 (4th Cir. 1977) (after retrial, second judge's imposition of a greatly
increased sentence from that imposed by the first judge appeared retaliatory and was prohib-
ited by Pearce); United States v. Floyd, 519 F.2d 1031, 1035 (5th Cir. 1975) (Pearce applied
despite express showing by sentencing judge that no vindictiveness was involved); United
States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1974) (greater sentence impermissible on re-
sentencing because court was not made aware of any new facts, even though defendant con-
victed on increased charges); Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) ("[o]n the strength of Pearce, we again see the more drastic
sentence on the second trial as a denial of Federal due process, in that by discouragement it
impinges upon the State-given appeal"). See also Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st
Cir. 1967) (prior to Pearce); Rice v. Simpson, 274 F.Supp. 116 (M.D. Ala. 1967), affl'd, 395
U.S. 711 (1969) (companion case to Pearce). But see United States v. Baer, 575 F.2d 1295,
1300-01 (10th Cir. 1978) (misdemeanor defendant held not victim of judicial retaliation for
refusing to consent to trial before a magistrate despite district judge's critical comments). Cf.
Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1970) (judge had no discretion to reimpose
original sentence when defendant backed out of plea bargain and was reconvicted on more
serious charges).
", 395 U.S. at 726.
[Vol. XXXVI
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And
since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter
a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack
his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be
freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part
of the sentencing judge. 0
While the Court held that it was permissible for a judge to impose a
more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, 21 the reasons for
a harsher sentence must appear on the record.2 Those reasons must be
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time the original sentence is
imposed. The factual basis for the increased sentence must be placed on
the record so that the "constitutional legitimacy" of the judge's reasons
may be reviewed.?
In Pearce, the limitation on increasing the defendant's punishment on
retrial was directed at the trial judge. Five years later, in Blackledge v.
Perry,4 the Supreme Court extended the prophylactic rule of Pearce to the
prosecutor. The Court held that the due process clause constituted a bar
to a prosecutor's use of increased charges on retrial, where "upping the
ante" gave the appearance of vindictiveness, and thus discouraged a defen-
dant's exercise of his statutory appellate remedy."
While incarcerated in the North Carolina penitentiary, Perry was in-
volved in an altercation with another inmate and charged with the misde-
meanor offense of assault with a deadly weapon. He was tried by the court,
sitting without a jury, and given a six-month sentence to be served upon
completion of the sentence he was then serving."
North Carolina employs a two-tier criminal justice system for misde-
meanors. A convicted misdemeanant, upon his request, is entitled to a trial
de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. This de novo trial may be ob-
tained by the defendant by filing a notice of appeal, and no allegation of
20 Id. at 725.
21 Id. at 722-23.
22 Id. at 723.
2 Id. The Supreme Court declined to extend the Pearce rationale in Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104 (1972). Kentucky had a two-tier system that permitted a misdemeanor defen-
dant convicted in an inferior court to obtain a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction.
In Colton, the defendant claimed that the rationale of Pearce prevented the court of general
jurisdiction from imposing a sentence upon him on retrial greater than the sentence which
was originally imposed in the lower court. Id. at 114-15. The Court held that the Pearce
rationale was inapplicable to the Colton situation, because Pearce was directed at insuring
the absence of "vindictiveness" against a defendant who attacked his initial conviction. Since
the judge in the court of general jurisdiction was different from the one who imposed the
original sentence, the rule of Pearce was not required. 407 U.S. at 114-19.
24 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
23 Id. at 27-28.
2Id. at 22.
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errors below is necessary.
Following his conviction in the lower court, Perry requested a trial de
novo. Prior to trial, the prosecutor superseded the misdemeanor charge
with a felony indictment, charging Perry with assault with intent to kill
on the basis of the same conduct as that alleged in the misdemeanor
complaint.28 Perry entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to a term of
five to seven years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the prison
sentence he was then serving. The effect of this sentence was to lengthen
his potential incarceration by approxmiately seventeen months beyond
what it would have been had he not appealed and requested a trial de
novo.29
The Supreme Court identified the issue as "whether the opportuni-
ties for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to impel the conclusion
that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce
case."3 " The Court concluded that the new indictment was impermissible.
"The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten [v. Kentucky],3' and Chaf-
fin [v. Stynchcombe]3 2 is that the due process clause is not offended by
all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but
only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' ,3
The Court observed that the prosecutor had a strong interest in discour-
aging misdemeanants from appealing and requesting a trial de novo, since
appeals necessitate increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources and
pose the possibility that a defendant may go free. Since the prosecutor has
the means to discourage such appeals by "upping the ante" to a felony
indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory
remedy, the state could discourage all but the most confident or most
desperate defendants from facing the risks of a trial de novo.34 Although
the Court found no evidence that the prosecutor acted either in bad faith
or maliciously in indicting Perry on the felony charge, the Court observed
that actual retaliatory motivation was not required. As in Pearce, "since
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's
exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a
retaliatory motivation . . . ."15 Since North Carolina chose originally to
1 Id. at 22-23. In North Carolina, the District Court Division of the General Court of
Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of misdemeanors. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272
(1969). Any person convicted of a misdemeanor in the District Court has an absolute right to
a trial de novo in the Superior Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-290, 15-177.1 (1969) (§ 7A-290
currently codified at 1977 Cum. Supp.; § 15-177.1 was repealed in 1973). For a discussion of
two-tier systems found in other states, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112-14 & nn.4-
11 (1972); note 23 supra.
21 417 U.S. at 23.
29 Id. at 23 & n.2.
3o Id. at 27.
31 407 U.S. 104 (1972); see note 23 supra.
32 412 U.S. 17 (1973); see note 18 supra.
417 U.S. at 27.
' Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 28 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)).
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prosecute the misdemeanor charge, the Court held that the state was
"precluded by the Due Process Clause from calling upon [Perry] to an-
swer to the more serious charge in the Superior Court." 6
The rule that emerges from the Supreme Court's decisions in Pearce
and Blackledge is that the due process clause prohibits the state from
retaliating against a defendant's exercise of constitutional or statutory
rights. Because the mere appearance of vindictivenes may deter a defen-
dant from challenging the lawfulness of his conviction, due process con-
cepts prohibit the state from "upping the ante." The rule applies whenever
the prosecution has knowledge of the facts essential to the more serious
charge at the time of the original indictment. The good faith or bad faith
of the prosecutor is irrelevant37 and it is not necessary for the defendant
to show actual vindictiveness. Absent an adequate justification for the
superseding or additional charges, vindictiveness will be presumed.
II. APPLICATION OF THE Pearce/Blackledge
RULE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Blackledge, lower federal courts
have applied the Pearce/Blackledge rule to a wide variety of situations to
insure that defendants can pursue their rights free from any threat of
prosecutorial retaliation. The rule has been applied to the assertion of
constitutional rights such as effective assistance of counsel," trial by jury,39
31 Id. at 30. Thus, unlike Pearce, whose due process rights could have been protected by
resentencing, see 395 U.S. at 725-26, Perry's due process rights could only have be'en vindi-
cated if the filing of the more serious charges had been banned altogether. 417 U.S. at 30-31.
In Blackledge, the Supreme Court clearly distinguished the situation where the prosecu-
tor is unable to bring the more serious charge in the initial prosecution. Id. at 29 n.7. In so
doing, it implicitly reaffirmed the analysis set forth in a number of lower federal court
decisions. For example, in Colon v. Hendry, 408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969), a pre-Pearce case,
the defendant had been convicted of various misdemeanor offenses in a Florida state court.
This conviction had been voided by a federal district court in a prior habeas corpus action
because Colon had been denied his right to counsel. After Colon's conviction was set aside,
the state filed felony charges against him based on the same facts as those underlying the
misdemeanor prosecution. Prior to the second trial, Colon again petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that his right to seek federal habeas corpus was being infringed.
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, then-Circuit Judge Griffin Bell remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on why the felony charges had been filed. He noted that,
absent some valid justification, the filing of the felony charges constituted "an impermissible
inhibition on [Colon's] right to seek the federal writ." Id. at 866.
Similar results, focusing on whether there was a valid reason for the prosecution to
institute additional charges, were reached in pre-Blackledge cases. See United States v.
Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974) (additional charge filed after defendant was permitted
to withdraw a guilty plea); Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F.Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (more
serious felony charged after defendant's original plea of guilty found to be involuntary).
1 Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.").
Is United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
3' United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
1979]
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and reasonable bail."0 The rule has been extended to cover the assertion of
statutory rights," as well as situations where the assertion of rights was
informal'2 or even unsuccessful.'3
The decisions of the lower courts demonstrate, with one notable excep-
tion," concern that the possible appearance of vindictiveness is sufficient
to violate a defendant's due process rights. Also, the lower courts have
focused on whether evidence supporting the increased charge was in the
hands of the prosecutor at the time of the original indictment.
A. Appearance of Vindictiveness
Courts applying the Pearce/Blackledge rule have been sensitive to the
reality that even when there is no evidence of actual vindictive purpose,
the possible appearance of vindictiveness by the prosecutor will violate the
defendants' right of due process. Thus, when a superseding indictment
contains an additional or more severe charge, the prosecutor has been
required to justify affirmatively the increased charge. 5 In the absence of
" United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
"See United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978) (assertion of rights under
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976)); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224,
1226-27 (9th Cir. 1977) (assertion of venue rights for trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1976));
Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793, 794-95 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (assertion of right to be
personally present at plea and sentencing under IowA CODE § 77.12 (1978)). The Pearce!
Blackledge rule also has been applied to the exercise of a procedural right under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1174-75
(9th Cir. 1976) (noncompliance with FED. R. CaM. P. 11 in accepting original guilty plea).
42 United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977). In Alvarado-
Sandoval, the prosecutor sought a superseding felony indictment after he was advised by
defendant's counsel that he wished to investigate the possibility of contesting the legality of
a search. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on the felony charges, holding that
the "failure to interpose a formal motion [challenging the search] before the magistrate does
not effectively distinguish this case from Ruesga-Martinez .. ." Id. at 646; see United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976); text accompanying notes 52-59
infra.
0 Wynn v. United States, 386 A.2d 695 (D.C. 1978). In Wynn, the defendant moved to
have charges against him dismissed due to the government's failure to grant him a speedy
trial or, in the alternative, to have his trial date advanced. Id. at 696. The motion to dismiss
was denied, but the trial was advanced. However, when the government was unable to locate
one of its witnesses on such short notice, the trial court dismissed the information without
prejudice. The government then refiled the charges, and added two misdemeanor counts to
the second information. Wynn was convicted on the original charge and on one of the addi-
tional charges. Id. at 696-97. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals strongly condemned
the additional charges in the second information where the "defendant has sought dismissal
of an information or indictment for failure to obtain a speedy trial and soon thereafter does
in fact obtain a dismissal under circumstances resembling failure to prosecute . . ." Id. at
697. See also United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant asserted right
to speedy trial).
" United States v. Litton Systems, Inc., 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
101 (1978); see text accompanying notes 126-62 infra.
0 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1171-73 (4th Cir. 1976) (prosecutor
may rebut appearance of vindictiveness by showing that evidence upon which increased
charge was based was not available at time defendant asserted right); United States v.
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such a justification, the appearance of vindictiveness- cannot easily be
dispelled.
The courts of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and-the
Ninth Circuit have rejected prosecution arguments that the absence of any
indication of actual vindictiveness validates the prosecutor's conduct in
recharging. In United States v. Jamison," the defendants were charged
originally with second-degree murder and a weapons offense. At the close
of the government's case, the defendants moved for a mistrial because of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 7 The defendants were subsequently re-
indicted and convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, the defendants
contended that due process required that the fear of a vindictive charge
increase following a successful motion for mistrial be dispelled by prohibit-
ing the increase." The court of appeals of the District of Columbia agreed.
In rejecting the government's argument that the impact of the in-
creased charge was not as significant as in Blackledge,19 the court stated:
The fact that in a particular case the actual impact on the
defendant of a charge increase is slight is, or course, not determina-
tive, any more than the fact that a prosecutor may not in fact have
acted out of vindictiveness, for the evil to which Pearce is directed
is the apprehension on the defenddnt's part of receiving a
vindictively-imposed penalty for the assertion of rights. Moreover,
we would hesitate to distinguish Pearce even in a case where the
only possible prejudicial effect of the charge increase was minimal.
The difficulty of drawing the line between those charge increases
which do and do not carry sufficient potential impact to require
restrictions of the kind imposed in Pearce persuades us that all
charge increases should in this respect be treated alike."
The court concluded that since the record failed to illuminate any reasons
why the first degree murder charge was brought, the re-indictment for first
degree murder denied the defendant due process."
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ruesga-Martinez2 also applied
the Pearce/Black ledge rule to a re-indictment in which there was a
"significant possibility" that the increased charge may have resulted from
a vindictive motive or purpose.0 In Ruesga-Martinez, the defendant was
Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (government must discover new evidence
justifying more severe charges or have been excusably unaware of such evidence to rebut
appearance of vindictiveness); Wynn v. United States, 386 A.2d 695, 698 n.10 (D.C. 1978).
4 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'7 See id. at 409.
, Id. at 410.
" In Black ledge, the charge was increased from a misdemeanor to a felony and carried a
possible sentence increase of seven years, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 23 n.2 (1974); see
text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
505 F.2d at 415 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 417.
52 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1369.
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arraigned before a United States Magistrate on a misdemeanor complaint
charging him with unlawful entry into the United States. At arraignment
the defendant refused to sign a waiver of his right to be tried before a
district judge.54 Following the defendant's refusal to waive this right, the
government filed a two-count felony indictment charging him as a multiple
offender."
Ruesga-Martinez moved unsuccessfully for dismissal of the second in-
dictment, and was thereafter convicted on both counts and sentenced to
three years imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed, finding abso-
lutely no evidence in the record justifying the increased charge."
The Ninth Circuit noted that the prosecutor bears a "heavy burden of
proving that any increase in the severity of the charges was not the result
of a vindictive motive."5 7 Furthermore, the court emphasized that "the
mere appearance of vindictiveness" is enough to require affirmative justifi-
cation of the increased charge.58 The absence from the record of any evi-
dence of vindictiveness did not validate prosecutorial conduct which was
otherwise "inherently suspect."" With perhaps one exception" none of
Id. at 1368. The statutory right to be tried by a district court judge, rather than by a
magistrate, on a federal misdemeanor charge is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b). Id. at 1370.
A defendant's refusal to waive this right has led repeatedly to allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct. E.g., United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussed at note
79 infra); United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United
States v. Baer, 575 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1978) (judicial retaliation alleged).
The court of appeals in Ruesga-Martinez did not reach the issue whether a misdemeanor
defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial. See 534 F.2d at 1370 n.5.
" 534 F.2d at 1369. When the original complaint was filed, the prosecutor was aware that
the defendant was a multiple offender who could have been charged with a felony. The
prosecutor elected, however, to charge the defendant with a misdemeanor. Id.
" Id. at 1369. The court stated, "In the present case, the only new facts alleged in the
felony indictment were appellant's previous arrest, conviction and deportation." Id. at 1370.
0 Id. at 1370.
M Id. (emphasis in original); accord, United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645
(9th Cir. 1977). But see Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
In Alvarado-Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit found the possibility of the appearance of
vindictiveness in the reindictment of a defendant who only informally asserted a constitu-
tional right. See note 42 supra. This case is significant in light of the remarkably tentative
nature of the defendant's assertion of rights.
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Hardwick v. Doolittle refused to adopt a standard
consistent with the Blackledge Court's concern for the impact of the appearance of vindictive-
ness on a defendant. In Hardwick, the defendant was indicted on one count of bank robbery
and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the robbery of a Georgia bank. Id. at
294. Subsequent to Hardwick's efforts to obtain removal of his case to federal district court
and his special plea of insanity, the prosecutor obtained a superseding indictment charging
Hardwick with two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault arising
out of the same incident which was the basis of the original indictment. Id. at 294, 302. The
jury convicted him on all four counts and sentenced him to two life sentences and two ten-
year terms. Id. at 294.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit twisted badly the Blackledge/Pearce rule to protect the
"broad ambit [of] prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 301. Although the court recognized that
the trial record contained no indication why the two additional counts were brought after the
defendant "had exercised various procedural rights," the court held that "the apprehension
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the lower courts applying the Pearce/Blackledge rule expressly found
that the prosecutor's action to have been motivated by malice. Rather,
the appearance of vindictiveness or apprehension of vindictiveness
created by the prosecutor's action in filing the increased charges violates
the due process clause. Therefore, those courts which require proof of a
prosecutor's vindictive intent in filing the increased charge miscompre-
hend due process concerns with underlie the Supreme Court's decision
in Pearce and Blackledge.
B. Prosecutor's Knowledge of Offenses
at Time of Original Charge
A crucial factor in many lower court decisions applying the
Pearce/Blackledge rule has been that at the time of the original indictment
the prosecutor knew of the basic facts or events supporting the additional
charges brought on re-indictment.
of vindictiveness which controlled the decision in Blackledge" had no application to Hard-
wick's situation. Id. at 302.
The court stressed that Blackledge involved the substitution of a more serious
"variation" of the same offense after the initial decision to prosecute. Id. at 301. The court
distinguished the additional counts in Hardwick as "different and distinct" activities even
though the charges arose out of the same bank robbery. Id. at 302. The Fifth Circuit deemed
the additional charges to be a "new prosecution" and held:
[If we were to adopt apprehension of vindictiveness as opposed to vindictiveness
in fact to be the standard by which we judge whether new prosecutions for different
criminal activities may be initiated, we would render the prosecutor's discretion
meaningless .... In such a situation, it is enough that a prosecutor, who decides
to add charges to a prior indictment, prove that he did not in fact act vindictively.
The test is to be applied to the prosecutor's actions rather than the defendant's
reactions.
Id. (emphasis added). This purported application of Blackledge totally avoids the purpose of
the Pearce/Blackledge rule. By creating an artificial and unrealistic label for superseding
indictments and by focusing on the prosecutor's actual intentions, the Fifth Circuit has
abandoned the defendant's due process right to pursue his procedural rights without fear of
prosecutorial retaliation. This decision is contrary to the majority of lower court applications
of the Pearce/Blackledge rule.
51 534 F.2d at 1369 & n.2. But see United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977)
(holding Blackledge inapplicable on facts similar to Ruesga-Martinez). In addition to the
strong emphasis on the defendant's right to be free from the fear of retaliation, the Ruesga-
Martinez decision is significant because of the court's sweeping language about the scope of
the rights protected: "Pearce and Blackledge apply regardless of whether the accused asserts
a constitutional right, a common law right, or a statutory right. . . ... 534 F.2d at 1370. But
cf. United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977)(court spoke only in terms
of rights with "due process overtones").
" The one exception is United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978):
This coincidence of events prevents overwhelming circumstantial evidence
that the indictment was returned and filed in retaliation for appellant's suggestion
that the Speedy Trial Act barred prosecution on the cocaine complaint. With full
knowledge of the appellant's violation of the marihuana laws and the extent of his
cooperation in January, the government did not see fit to seek the indictment until
shortly after the appellant had asserted his statutory rights.
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In United States v. Jamison," the District of Columbia Circuit noted
that a prosecutor might justify increasing a charge on retrial under two
circumstances: first, if at the time of the original indictment the prosecutor
lacked evidence of essential elements of the more serious offense; and,
second, if the government discovers new evidence of which it was
"excusably unaware" at the time the original charge was brought."2
Two federal circuit courts have strictly applied the "new evidence"
justification to reject government attempts to increase charges. In United
States v. DeMarco,3 the prosecution brought a three count indictment
against the defendant DeMarco charging conspiracy to defraud the United
'States, making false statements to IRS agents in Washington, D.C., and
willfully obstructing a congressional proceeding." After the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia granted motions for change of
venue,65 the prosecutor informed defense counsel that if DeMarco insisted
on having the trial in Los Angeles, the government would "restructure" its
case by bringing an additional charge against him for making false state-
ments to an IRS agent in California. DeMarco refused to forego trial in
Los Angeles. Shortly after the three-count indictment was transferred, the
prosecutor, true to his word, obtained an additional one-count indictment
in the Central District of California.
In the district court the government attempted to distinguish Pearce,
Blackledge and Jamison by arguing that in each of those cases the prosecu-
tor charged a more serious offense on retrial based on the same facts which
See also United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d
1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976). But see Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1977)
(dismissed at note 58 supra).
" 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12 Id. at 416-17.
0 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd., 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 827 (1977).
', 401 F. Supp. at 507.
' Id. at 508. The right to a change of venue to the defendant's home district arises under
18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1976).
" 401 F. Supp. at 508. The government also advanced several legal arguments to avoid
the impact of Blackledge. First, the prosecution contended that Blackledge only applied
where interests protected by the constitutional right against double jeopardy were involved.
Although the court found this distinction to be consistent with the facts of Blackledge, it also
found the distinction to be inconsistent with the sweeping language of that decision. Id. at
510. Second, the government analogized its actions to plea bargaining and argued that if plea
bargaining was constitutional, so was venue bargaining. The court rejected this analogy,
observing that "while plea bargaining may be necessary for the effective administration of
criminal justice, venue bargaining is hardly a necessary component of the prosecutor's arse-
nal." Id. at 511. Third, the government urged that because it had dismissed one of the counts
of the District of Columbia indictment (the consiracy charge) on its own motion, prior to trial
and during the court's consideration of the defendant's Blackledge motion, the defendant did
not face the prospect of "increased charges." The court also rejected that contention, because
the government's proposed substitution of charges came too late. Since the dismissal had not
occurred until after the defendant had been threatened with the prospect of increased
charges, the government had lost its right to bring the threatened charge. Id. at 511-12.
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gave rise to the initial charges." In DeMarco, the prosecutor argued that
the California indictment for false statement made in California was de-
rived from facts different from those upon which the District of Columbia
indictment rested. The court expressly rejected the argument:
All of the charges against DeMarco relate to the events surround-
ing the claim and defense of a tax deduction from an alleged 1969
gift by former President Nixon to the United States. Moreover, as
the government conceded, the conspiracy count [Count 1] em-
braces the California facts.
6
Moreover, the district court noted that even if the facts of the California
indictment were wholly dissimilar to the District of Columbia indictment,
"a different result need not obtain" since the threat of the new indictment
was an effort to prevent the defendant from exercising his right to a
change of venue."
In affirming dismissal of the California indictment, the Ninth Circuit
found that even though the facts supporting the two indictments were not
identical, the charges arose from the same "factual nucleus." 0 This was a
correct application of the Pearce/Blackledge rule and Jamison. The court
narrowed the "new evidence" justification considerably when it stated:
Even if the first and second indictments were not based on facts
that were so similar that a trial on one would have prevented trial
on the other upon double jeopardy grounds, that situation would
not distinguish this case from Blackledge . . . . Apprehension of
vindictiveness and "the appearance of vindictiveness" . . . are
adequate to bring the case squarely within Blackledge."1
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, the degree of similarity of the facts from which
the first and subsequent indictments arise is only one factor bearing on the
vindictiveness question.
In most cases in which the courts find that there was no new evidence
to justify an increase of charges, the point of reference has usually been
the prosecutor's knowledge at the time of the original indictment. In
United States v. Johnson,2 the Fourth Circuit offered a variation on the
method of evaluating a prosecutor's awareness of essential facts.
In 1972, Johnson was charged in a four-count indictment with partici-
pation in a heroin distribution scheme. Pursuant to an agreement with the
prosecutors, Johnson entered a guilty plea to counts 1 and 4, and the
government dropped counts 2 and 3. In 1974, Johnson's plea was set aside
by the Fourth Circuit for noncompliance with the requirements of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.13 The government subsequently obtained
17 Id. at 511-12 n.2.
"Id.
" Id. at 508.
71 550 F.2d at 1226.
" Id. at 1226-27.
" 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1171-72. FED. R. CM P. 11 establishes specific procedures for insuring that
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a superseding indictment charging Johnson with the original four counts
plus 37 new charges. Johnson was tried on eight counts, of which only the
first was among the original charges, and was convicted on all eight. 4
The court of appeals held that the Pearce/Blackledge rule barred the
government from proceeding on any of the 41 counts in the superseding
indictment other than the four counts charged in the original indictment.
The government argued that since the prosecutor did not know of the
crimes charged in the second indictment at the time the first indictment
was filed, there could have been no denial of due process.7 5 The govern-
ment did know, however, of the "essential facts" giving rise to the 37
additional counts at the time Johnson entered his original guilty plea, and
was content to except the plea to two of the four original counts in light of
those facts.78 No new evidence was discovered during the year and a half
between Johnson's plea and the new indictment.
In rejecting the government's argument that the absence of evidence at
the time of the original indictment eliminated any appearance of vindic-
tiveness, the Fourth Circuit stated:
The reference to return of the indictment as the time for assessing
the prosecutor's knowledge does not imply that some other date
might not be equally critical, and the opinion does not attempt to
catalog all tactics that may engender apprehension of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. Rather, Blackledge unequivocally assures a pris-
oner of his right to appeal without fear that the prosecutor will
retaliate with a more serious charge if the original conviction is
reversed. Therefore, instead of simply assessing the prosecutor's
knowledge at the time the original indictment was returned, as the
government suggests, we must examine all circumstances of John-
son's situation.
77
The Johnson decision stands for the proposition that a prosecutor's knowl-
edge of the basis for additional charges is not to be mechanically tested as
of the date the original charges are filed. The court in Johnson seemed
to require that, in judging a rebuttal of the appearance of vindictiveness,
courts should focus on the availability of evidence at the time the right is
asserted by the defendant, and not solely at the time the initial accusa-
tory pleading is filed.
C. Justifications for Increased Charges
In a handful of cases, the government has succeeded in convincing the
court that intervening events rebutted the appearance of vindictiveness
prohibited by the PearcelBlackledge rule. Several federal courts of appeals
pleas entered in criminal cases are voluntary and understood by the defendant.
7 Id.
11 Id. at 1172-73.




have allowed increased charges after a defendant has withdrawn his
bargained-for guilty plea or has collaterally attacked such a plea and the
plea has been overturned on appeal." The Eighth Circuit has accepted the
need to protect the identity of an informer as a legitimate, strategic reason
for withholding a charge in the original indictment. 9 Also, as has been
discussed above, the discovery of new evidence of additional crimes has
been an intervening factor which dispels the appearance of vindictiveness
created by increased charges on retrial."0 In several other cases, however,
the courts misapplied the rule by ignoring the issue of whether the govern-
ment's action created the appearance of vindictiveness."1
,1 Moore v. Foti, 546 F.2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson,
537 F.2d 1170, 1174-75 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 121-22 n.2
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 588
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rines, 453 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Wil-
liams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
"1 United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118, 123 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037
(1978).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 953 (1976). Although the proposition that later discovered evidence may rebut the
appearance of vindictiveness is sound, the court in Preciado-Gomez may have misapplied it
to the facts of the case. The defendant was originally tried on a two-count indictment alleging
certain immigration offenses which had occured in June 1974. That trial resulted in a hung
jury, and a mistrial was declared. The government then reindicted Preciado-Gomez, charging
him with the two offenses which were the subject of the fist trial, plus two additional
immigration-related offenses which had occurred in April 1972. Id. at 937. With respect to
the additional charges, the court stated:
[Defendant's] conduct, occurring prior to the original charge of unlawful entry,
was suspected, but only ascertained by the prosecution after the aborted trial at
which no judgment was entered.
Thus, it was proper in Preciado [-Gomez] to charge against him separate,
different and earlier charges in a superseding indictment, not established to the
satisfaction of the prosecution at the time of Preciado's arrest on June 13, 1974, or
his indictment on June 25, 1974, or his mistrial on September 20, 1974.
Id. at 941. However, since evidence of the 1972 offense was available to the government, see
id. at 940-41 & n.1, it seems unlikely that the government lacked the necessary evidence to
have charged the defendant with the additional offense at the fi-st trial. In U.S. v. Ruesga-
Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976), a different panel of the 9th Circuit rejected the
notion that Preciado-Gomez could be read as holding that absence from the record of any
evidence of vindictiveness is sufficient to justify an increase in the severity of the charges.
The Court limited Preciado-Gomez to the situation where the prosecution did not have all
the facts at the time the original charge was made. Id. at 1369 n.2.
A separate issue which was not discussed by the Preciado-Gomez court is what right did
the defendant assert for which the prosecution was retaliating? The hung jury situation in
Preciado-Gomez is not entirely analogous to the mistrial declared in United States v. Jami-
son, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the defense prematurely terminated a prosecution
which was going well. It is more difficult to lay the "blame" for a hung jury mistrial at the
feet of the defense, if the prosecutor wanted to discourage the defendant's exercise of some
legal right. United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 255-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 196
(1978); see United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
' See United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558
F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978); note 58 supra; United States v.
Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977). In Sturgill, the court of appeals focused not on the
appearance of vindictiveness, but rather on whether the defendant would be "forced to stand
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The Seventh Circuit case United States v. Anderson"2 is illustrative of
those cases in which courts have permitted more serious charges after a
bargained-for plea has been set aside. In Anderson, the defendant was
originally charged with use of a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, a second information was filed, charging An-
derson with larceny of 35 dollars from the bank. The defendant was sent-
enced to 10 years imprisonment on his guilty plea and the original charge
was dismissed. Six months later, Anderson collaterally attacked his con-
viction to have the guilty plea set aside for noncompliance with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The motion was granted when the govern-
ment acknowledged that, at the time of sentencing, everyone involved
(including the defendant) erroneously believed that the maximum punish-
ment for larceny was ten years. The government then obtained an indict-
ment which charged the same offense as the original information.8
trial on more severe charges than were contained in the [original] complaint." Id. at 309.
Sturgill was charged with four misdemeanors under the Kentucky law, brought in federal
court under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, as having been committed on the
premises of the Naval Ordnance Station in Louisville, Kentucky. At his initial appearance,
Sturgill refused to waive his right to trial before a district judge, and thereafter the govern-
ment brought two additional misdemeanor charges against him, which arose from the same
facts as the initial charges.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Blackledge and Ruesga-Martinez on the basis that the
additional charges were punishable by fine only, and that prior to trial (but after the addi-
tional charges were brought) the government had filed a notice of intent to "nolle pros" the
charge which carried the longest potential period of confinement. "Thus at trial Sturgill was
subjected to charges carrying the same potential fine and a shorter potential period of incar-
ceration [than those originally filed]." 563 F.2d at 309 n.2. By focusing exclusively on the
possible maximum punishment which the defendant faced at the time of trial, the Sturgill
court entirely ignored the question of the appearance of vindictiveness and erroneously held
the Blackledge rule to be inapplicable. Id. at 309.
In United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit did not
address the issue of vindictiveness, but focused on the admitted guilt of the defendant. In
November, 1975, Stacey confessed to a charge of failing to report a sum of money in excess
of $5,000 brought into the United States in furtherance of a conspiracy to export marijuana
into Canada. In early 1977, Stacey sought return of the funds confiscated. Thereafter, in
March 1977, the government obtained an indictment based on the 1975 confession. Id. at 441-
42.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that Pearce and Blackledge were inapplicable, de-
spite the government's acknowledgment that one reason it had sought the indictment was
Stacey's action to seek return of the money. The court held that the defendant's demand for
the return of the impounded funds was not the assertion of "a statutory right that has due
process implications" envisioned under the Pearce/Blackledge rule. Id. at 443 (emphasis in
original) (quoting United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977)).
The Eighth Circuit erred in three specific respects. First, it ignored the appearance of
vindictiveness issue, which is the heart of the Pearce/Blackledge rule. Second, the court
erroneously placed the burden of proving vindictiveness on the defendant, rather than requir-
ing the prosecution to prove its absence. Third, the court engrafted into Pearce and
Blackledge the requirement that the vindictiveness be manifested in reaction to a right
asserted in the criminal proceedings. None of these three criteria find any support in either
Pearce or Blackledge.
92 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
9 Id. at 585.
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The Seventh Circuit rejected Anderson's charge of prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness. The court noted that at the time the defendant originally entered
his guilty plea, there were two valid informations pending against him, and
the government had not "elected on which charge they would try Anderson
if the case went to trial."8 The court held, therefore, that "the mere
reinstitution of the [original] charges, under these circumstances, did not
amount to a deprivation of Anderson's due process rights.",,
It is important to recognize that the Anderson court was not approving
more serious charges brought on retrial, nor charges not originally con-
fronting the defendant at the time of his first plea. Rather, the prosecutor
reinstituted the exact charges which the defendant faced originally when
he entered into *the plea bargain. In this respect, restoration of the status
quo ante could not be considered as retaliatory, any more than could
prosecution on the original charge had the plea bargain fallen through prior
to entry of the guilty plea.86
In United States v. Partyka,7 the government's unwillingness to dis-
close the identity of its informer led to reversal of a conviction for a misde-
meanor offense for possession of PCP tablets." The government then re-
filed the misdemeanor possession charge on which the defendant had origi-
nally been convicted and sought a felony indictment for distribution of the
drug MDA. Partyka attacked the felony indictment on the ground that the
charge was brought in retaliation of his exercise of the right to appeal." In
rejecting Partyka's claim of retaliation, the Eight Circuit held that if any
appearance of vindictiveness existed, the government had successfully re-
butted such appearance:
In our view the indictment was procured not merely because the
conviction had been reversed but because the collateral effect of
the reversal was to disclose the identity of Faircloth as the govern-'
ment's informer and thus remove the government's valid reason for
"Id. at 588.
Id. (emphasis added).
8 In this respect, Anderson is entirely consistent with United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170 (4th Cir. 1970); see text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
Courts have been properly suspicious of a prosecutor's attempt to justify an increased
charge on the basis of a defendant's noncompliance with the terms of a plea bargain. In
United States v. Gogarty, 533 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit held that noncompli-
ance with the terms of a deferred prosecution agreement permitted reinstatement of original
charges and indictment for later offenses. However, in the absence of a formal, written
agreement such as in Gogarty, noncompliance or noncooperation by a defendant should not
be accepted as an affirmative justification for increasing charges after a defendant has as-
serted a constitutional or statutory right. See United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.
1978) (court held that defendant's assertion of statutory right to speedy trial, rather than his
alleged noncompliance with plea bargain, triggered superseding indictment on more serious
charges).
561 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 121-22.
" Id. at 123.
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not indicting the defendant on the distribution [of MDA] charge
when it originally indicted him on the [PCP] possession charge."
D. Summary
The lower court cases which condemn the prosecutor's conduct do so
almost uniformly because of the existence of the appearance of vindictive-
ness and the lack of an intervening justification. These cases hew closely
to the concerns expressed in Pearce and Blackledge. Cases which condone
the government's conduct, however, are often less consistent with the
teachings of Pearce and Blackledge. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits in
particular have been reluctant to recognize the effect of the appearance of
prosecutorial retaliation on the exercise of constitutional and statutory
rights."
The lower courts have properly identified three situations which do not
fall directly within the Pearce/Blackledge rule: reinstatement of original
charges after withdrawal of plea bargain, discovery of new evidence of
additional crimes, and legitimate, strategic reasons for not charging sepa-
rate offenses. However, these "exceptions" must be construed narrowly if
the Pearce/Blackledge rule is to retain its full vitality. Thus, if a defendant
withdraws from a plea bargain and new and more severe charges are intro-
duced, or if the newly discovered evidence adds little to already known
facts of additional offenses, and if the "strategic" reason is a sham or
relates to charges arising from the same transaction, the prosecutor should
not be permitted to defeat the application of the Pearce/Blackledge rule.
Any purported justification of an increased charge on retrial should be
clearly and affirmatively set forth by the prosecutor and carefully exam-
ined by the court. Any less rigorous scrutiny tends to vitiate the prophylac-
tic principles of the rule.
III. THE PLEA BARGAINING EXCEPTION TO THE Pearce/Blackledge RULE
A. Bordenkircher v. Hayes
The Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes" repre-
sents a distinct step backwards from the position announced in Pearce and
Blackledge. In Bordenkircher, the Court ruled that it was permissible con-
duct, not proscribed by Blackledge," for a prosecutor during plea negotia-
tions to threaten a defendant with reindictment for a more serious offense
if he did not plead guilty to the lesser offense with which he was initially
charged."
Id. at 124.
" See United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1978) (discussed at note 81 supra);
Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussed at note 58 supra).
12 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
,1 Id. at 362-63. The Sixth Circuit had held, however, that the same potential for imper-
missible vindictiveness existed in Bordenkircher as in Blackledge. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d
42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
1 434 U.S. at 359.
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The defendant Hayes was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury for utter-
ing a forged instrument, an offense punishable by imprisonment for five
to ten years. Thereafter, Hayes, his counsel and the prosecuting attorney
met to discuss a possible plea agreement. The prosecutor offered to recom-
mend a sentence of five years if Hayes would enter a plea of guilty, but
stated that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would seek an indictment from
the grand jury charging Hayes under Kentucky's habitual criminal stat-
ute. 5 Under that statute, Hayes, a twice previously convicted felon, could
have received a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Hayes refused to
plead guilty and was subsequently indicted on the habitual criminal
charge. He was convicted on both the forgery and habitual criminal counts
and was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment. Hayes
petitioned unsuccessfully for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district
court. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Blackledge v. Perry pro-
tected Hayes from the vindictive exercise of the prosecutor's discretion. 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals
in a 5-4 decision.
Justice Stewart," writing for the majority, found that the recidivist
charge was fully justified by the evidence existing at the time the original
indictment was returned. Although the principles of Pearce and
Blackledge were expressly reaffirmed, the basis for those decisions was
reinterpreted:
The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases
such as Pearce and [Blackledge] lay not in the possibility that a
defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right. . .
but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against,
the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction ....
To punish a person because he had done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort
• . .and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action
whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights
is "patently unconstitutional."9
" Id. at 358-59; see Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (repealed 1975). This statute has-been
replaced by Ky. Rav. STAT. § 532.080 (1977 Supp.), which provides a much shorter term of
incarceration under more limited circumstances.
434 U.S. at 359.
, Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
" Justice Stewart also authored the opinions in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969) and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
" 434 U.S. at 363. Justice Stewart distinguished plea bargaining from the facts presented
in Pearce and Blackledge. Id. In Blackledge, Justice Stewart wrote:
The rationale of our judgment in the Pearce case ... was not grounded upon the
proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist. Rather, we
emphasized that "since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of
such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.". . . We think
it clear that the same considerations apply here. A person convicted of an offense
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The Court acknowledged the dynamics of the plea bargaining process
and the essential place it holds in our criminal justice system.' 0 The Court
differentiated, however, the "give and take" of plea bargaining from the
Pearce and Blackledge situations: "[T]here is no such element of punish-
ment or retaliation [in plea bargaining] so long as the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer."'' Given the salutory purposes
served by the plea bargaining process and the fact that defendants are
represented by presumptively competent counsel, thus being capable of
intelligent choices in response to prosecutorial persuasion, the majority
found that defendants are "unlikely to be driven to false self-
condemnation."'
0 2
The prosecutor's broad authority to determine what charges to bring
was both acknowledged and circumscribed when the Court noted that "so
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion. '"10 3 The Court acknowledged, however, the
existence of constitutional limitations on the prosecutor's broad discretion:
There is no doubt-that the breadth of discretion that our country's
legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the po-
tential that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attor-
neys carries with it the potential for both individual and institu-
tional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, there are
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise. We hold only
that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this
case, which no more than openly presented the defendant with the
unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on
which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
By its language, Bordenkircher necessarily is limited to the plea
bargaining process, and even then only when four criteria are met. First,
the prosecutor must openly present the defendant with the charges he will
face at trial if the defendant persists in a plea of not guilty. 05 Second, at
the time he puts the choice to the defendant, the prosecutor must have
probable cause to believe that the accused committed the offenses which
is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that
the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original
one . ..
417 U.S. at 28.
434 U.S. at 360-62.
,' Id. at 363.
102 Id.; see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 492, 500 (1978).
' 434 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
,0, Id. at 365.
,05 See id. at 360. The Court noted that although "the prosecutor did not actually obtain
the recidivist indictment after the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was
clearly expressed at the outset of the plea negotiations." Id.
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the prosecutor threatens to charge."6 Third, the offer must relate only to
the defendant and must not involve either adverse or lenient treatment of
a third person."7 Finally, the selection of persons or offenses to charge may
not be "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification."'1 The absence of any one of
these four criteria should render the Bordenkircher rationale inappli-
cable.
B. Lower Court Decisions Applying Bordenkircher to Condone the
Prosecutor's Conduct
In the first year since Bordenkircher was decided, the lower federal
courts have cited it in a number of cases. Some decisions have routinely
and without extended discussion held Bordenkircher to be directly control-
ling.' Other cases have held Bordenkircher not to be applicable on the
facts presented," while still other decisions have alluded to Bordenkircher
but have not purported to analyze it."' Two recent decisions are illustra-
tive of the current application of Bordenkircher by the lower federal courts.
In United States v. Allsup12 and Watkins v. Solem,"' the courts correctly
applied the Bordenkircher rule while still conforming to the constitutional
constraints of the Pearce/Blackledge rule.
In United States v. Allsup,"' the defendant was arrested on a federal
warrant for two bank robberies and a search of his car revealed a quantity
of marijuana and a .45 caliber pistol."5 Following his indictment for the
robberies, Allsup entered into a plea agreement whereby the government
I" See id. at 364. The Court did not define the term "probable cause" in this context.
The majority opinion refers to the ALI MoDEL CoDE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PRoCEDURE § 350.3
(1975) and the Commentary thereto, and to the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION §§ 2.5 & 3.9 (1971). 434 U.S. at 364-65 nn.8 & 9. See also ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS oF GuLTY § 3.1 (1968).
"0 434 U.S. at 364 n.8; see United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 397-98 (1st Cir. 1978).
'" 434 U.S. at 364 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
,"E.g., Montgomery v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 457, 458 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 135
(1978) (defendants may not be charged under Texas habitual offender statute after-they
refused to plead guilty to lesser offenses).
110 E.g., United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1978) (held Bordenkircher
inapplicable where government and accused had reached a plea agreement and completed
their obligations under the plea agreement before the government secured the indictment
which was the basis of its prosecution); United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-
44 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (held that Bordenkircher plea bargaining exception did not permit the
prosecution to obtain a superseding indictment after the defendants exercised their constitu-
tional rights to be admitted to reasonable bail).
"I E.g., United States v. Bambulas, 571 F.2d 525, 526-27 (10th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea
not invalid where at time of proceedings under FED. R. CpiM. P. 11 defendant denied any
coercive effect arising from terms of plea bargain).
" 573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3081 (1978).
H3 571 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978).
1" 573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1978).
HI Id. Allsup's possessionof the pistol was illegal under 18 U.S.C. H4 922(g)(1), 924(a)
& app. 1202(a)(1) (1976) because he was a convicted felon and the firearm had previously
been transported in interstate commerce. 573 F.2d at 1142.
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offered to dismiss one bank robbery charge and not prosecute the mari-
juana and firearms offenses in return for a plea of guilty to the other bank
robbery charge."' Prior to the entry of his promised plea, however, Allsup
repudiated the agreement. Following his conviction on both bank robbery
charges, the government secured an additional, two-count indictment
charging Allsup with the firearms offenses.'
In appealing his conviction on the firearms charges, the defendant al-
leged that prosecutorial vindictiveness for his refusal to plead guilty to
bank robbery was the sole reason behind the firearms indictriient.18 The
Ninth Circuit, relying on Bordenkircher, rejected that contention. The
court affirmed Allsup's conviction, holding that the government had
"exercised permissible prosecutorial discretion""' 9 by using the firearm
charges as a "latent bargaining tool" in this manner.
The case of Watkins v. Solem, "I involved an appeal from the denial of
a petition for habeus corpus. Watkins contended that his guilty plea in
state court had been involuntary because it had been induced by the
prosecutor's offer not to file habitual criminal charges in exchange for
Watkins' guilty plea to two charges of third-degree burglary."' While the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Watkins' petition on the authority
of Bordenkircher, it observed that the Supreme Court's holding was "very
narrow."'" The court admonished prosecutors not to regard Bordenkircher
"as giving them the right to abuse their prosecutorial powers."'1'
In both Allsup and Watkins, the four limiting conditions articulated in
Bordenkircher'2' were present. The Watkins decision in particular empha-
sizes the narrow scope of the Bordenkircher exceptions.' This narrow
construction, however, has not always been employed.
C. United States v. Litton Systems, Inc.
Recently, in United States v. Litton Systems, Inc., ,21 the Fourth Circuit
was presented with the opportunity to apply the Bordenkircher rule and
"1 573 F.2d at 1142.
H7 Id.
"I Id. at 1143. The Ninth Circuit noted that at trial the prosecutor did not deny that it
was in possession of sufficient information concerning the firearm charges at the time of the
robbery indictment. Id. at n.2. Nor did the prosecution deny that the defendant's refusal to
plead guilty to bank robbery charges induced the firearm indictment. Id. at 1443.
"I Id. at 1443. Although the Ninth Circuit did not discuss the appearance of vindictive-
ness issue, such an omission is not significant in a true Bordenkircher case where the prosecu-
tor carefully lays out all the options in advance. Therefore, Allsup is only a modest extension
of United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 82-
86 supra, and is fully consistent with the narrow Bordenkircher exception.
1- 571 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978).
21 Id. at 435-36.
" Id. at 436.
I' Id. The court stated that "[Bordenkircher] cannot be read as a grant of carte blanche
authority for a prosecutor to unduly threaten and coerce a criminal defendant into making a
guilty plea." Id.
I" See text accompanying notes 105-08 supra.
,,5 See also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 492, 501-02 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
I' 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 101 (1978).
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the principles of Pearce and Blackledge. Litton was before the Fourth
Circuit on the government's appeal of the trial court's dismissal of a one-
count indictment against Litton. The trial court had dismissed the indict-
ment because of prosecutorial misconduct during pre-indictment negotia-
tions."' The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, purportedly relying
on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,' how-
ever, the court completely misconstrued the rule of Bordenkircher and
perverted the language and logic of the Supreme Court.
1. The Factual Setting and the District Court's Opinion
In May 1972, Litton presented a claim to the government for cost over-
runs incurred during the construction of nuclear submarines for the United
States Navy. Litton claimed that these costs, totalling approximately $30
million, were the result of government requirements above the specifica-
tions of the contracts.- 9 The government contracting officers rejected the
claims and the matter was submitted by Litton to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). 11 The hearing before the ASBCA
spanned six months, concluding in March 1974. In April 1976, approxi-
mately two years after the conclusion of the hearing, the ASBCA issued
its decision, awarding Litton $16 million of its claim. The government and
Litton jointly agreed not to file a motion for reconsideration before the
ASBCA.'11
During the two-year interval between the completion of the hearing and
the decision of the ASBCA, the government began to present evidence
relating to the propriety of Litton's claims to a specially convened grand
jury. After hearing 25 days of testimony during its 18-month term, the
grand jury was discharged without returning an indictment. A week before
the grand jury's term was due to expire (in September 1976), the United
States attorney proposed to Litton's counsel that the government would
"terminate the investigation and not seek an indictment if Litton would
agree to allow the proceedings before the ASBCA to be reopened and to
permit evidence obtained by the grand jury to be presented to the
1v See id. at 198. The district court's memorandum opinion is unreported; however, it
appears as Appendix A to the Petition for Certiorari, Litton Systems, Inc. v. United States,
No. 77-1689, filed May 26, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari]. Reference will
be made to that opinion by citing to the appropriate page of the Appendix, i.e., A-i, A-2,
etc.
,23 Id. at 201.
'2 573 F.2d at 196.
130 The ASBCA operates as a trial level judicial tribunal to review contract disputes.
ASBCA decisions are final against the government and are not subject to judicial review at
the instance of the government except in a case of fraud. See S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 406 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1972) (construing the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1976)).
ASBCA decisions are binding against the government in subsequent litigation under the
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1968).
"' Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at A-2.
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ASBCA."'32 The government conceded that while it had evidence that the
claim was false, it had no evidence of intent.'1 At the meeting during
which this proposal was made, the government counsel informed Litton's
attorneys that termination of the matter in this fashion would only be
discussed if Litton's counsel agreed that "the discussions would not be
taken as a threat or treated as other than a good faith attempt to resolve
the intent question. 1 3 Litton rejected the government's proposal for ter-
mination.
In early 1977, Litton reconsidered and offered to accept the govern-
ment's proposal, but its offer was refused.' Thereafter, the government
summarized to a different grand jury the evidence presented to the special
grand jury,3 ' and in April 1977 Litton was indicted on a single count of
making a false claim against the government. During negotiations occur-
ring after the indictment had been returned, the prosecutor told defense
counsel that "Litton brought this indictment."'"7
Litton moved to dismiss the indictment because of prosecutorial vind-
ictiveness. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia conducted a hearing and found:
No matter how benign a view of the matter is urged by the
government, the truth of it is that the government wanted a
"second bite at the apple" in its controversy with Litton over the
issue of reimbursement; that it used the implied threat of indict-
ment in an effort to obtain reconsideration of what Litton, pre-
sumptively innocent, was otherwise entitled to; and that when
Id. at A-2 to A-3, A-5.
" Id. at A-3. The crime of submitting a false claim to the government requires proof of
intent. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976).
' Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at A-3.
' Id. at A-5.
' The summarization of 25 days of testimony before the special grand jury was made
by two special agents of the FBI. The district court found that in their presentation to the
second grand jury, the two FBI agents had not been required by government counsel:
1. To read and review all of the matters occurring before the eighteen-month
investigating grand jury;
2. To restrict their summary presentations to those matters occurring before
the eighteen-month grand jury;
3. To distinguish between hearsay and personal knowledge; and
4. To distinguish between matters occurring and not occurring before the
eighteen-month investigating grand jury.
Id. at A-5. The significance of this procedure was noted in the following terms:
The appearance and summation testimony before the grand jury of the two agents
is relevant, however, to the issue of the misconduct of the United States Attorney's
Office. One need not be a skeptic to question the impartiality of a presentation
which persuaded a grand jury that neither had heard nor seen the previous wit-
nesses or documents to do within ten days what the prior grand jury had not seen
fit to do after twenty-five days of evidentiary hearing over an eighteen-month
period. This is further evidence of the cynical view that has been taken of the grand
jury in this case, namely, as a mere echo of the office of the United States Attorney.
Id. at A-8 to A-9.
" Id. at A-6.
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Litton, as was its right, refused to forego that entitlement, namely,
the finality of the civil award, the government retaliated-made
good its threat-by producing an indictment. This is a serious
abuse of prosecutorial power.'
At the time of the original discussions the prosecution had no evidence
that a criminal offense had been committed,' and the district court re-
jected the government's argument that its proposal to terminate the inves-
tigation was motivated by a desire to ensure that the ASBCA had consid-
ered all the facts."' Similarly, the court rejected the notion that Litton had
waived its right to complain of this conduct because its attorneys had
agreed to the government's condition that the proposed termination be
considered a part of settlement negotiations. The district judge observed
that Litton's counsel had little choice but to agree to that condition, and
the stipulation did not lessen the coercive nature of the circumstances."4
The court found that the government had attempted to circumvent the
established statutory and regulatory scheme for the resolution of civil dis-
putes and that an "abridgement of [Litton's] substantive due process
rights" had occurred. In its order dismissing the indictment, the district
court concluded:
Allowing the government to circumvent -the finality otherwise ac-
corded the administrative resolution of contract disputes by
threatening criminal prosecution in substance abrogates the pri-
vate party's right to hold the government to its own rules. At the
very least the Court is warranted in exercising its supervisory
power over federal prosecutors where there is present deliberate




In The government lacked evidence demonstrating criminal intent to commit the of-
fense. Id. at A-7 to A-8 & n.4.
"I The district court elaborated as follows:
Had the bargain been proposed after indictment it arguably could be justified, but
what is reprehensible here is the threat to use, as well as the actual use of, the grand
jury as a bargaining tool in an effort to upset the final civil award to which Litton
was entitled.
Id. at A-6 to A-7 (emphasis in original).
"I Id. at A-8. The district court also condemned the fact that at the time the government
offered to "reopen" the matter before the ASBCA, it had subpoenaed two of the judges who
participated in the ASBCA decision awarding Litton the original $16 million. Although the
judges were not actually called to testify before the grand jury, they were interviewed by a
Special Assistant to the United States Attorney and two FBI agents to determine the extent
to which matters presented to the grand jury had also been considered by the ASBCA in its
decision-making process. Id. at A-9. In addition to noting its concern that the secrecy require-
ments of grand jury proceedings contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) might
have been violated, the court found that "[s]uch activity could only carry the potential for
depreciation of the ASBCA's impartiality and vitiation of its decisions in any reopened claim
or in future claims involving the defendant." Id.
"Z Id. at A-10.
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2. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
On the government's appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the case was
governed by the principles of Bordenkircher v. Hayes,13 but nonetheless
held that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment. "' In its
review of the case, the court analyzed the facts in the district court opinion
and attached significance to two facts not discussed by the district court:
first, that the Deputy United States Attorney General had reviewed Lit-
ton's contention that it was pressured to give up its civil award by threat
of an indictment; second, that approval for the indictment had been issued
by the Attorney General of the United States."' These findings were relied
upon to support a third finding that neither the Deputy Attorney General's
nor the Attorney General's action was vindictive.'
In an apparent conflict with the district court, the Fourth Circuit
found that the government had not threatened to indict Litton if it rejected
the proposal to reopen the ASBCA proceedings. Instead, it characterized
the prosecutor's statement as a warning to Litton's counsel that "the fraud
investigation would be continued to determine whether Litton should be
indicted.","7
The circuit court acknowledged that Litton had been asked to give up
its right to bar the ASBCA's reconsideration of the award. The court disa-
greed, however, with the district court's conclusion that the prosecutor's
conduct was unlawful. The Fourth Circuit interpreted Bordenkircher as
allowing a prosecutor to use the implied threat of indictment to deter a
defendant from exercising a legal right when the prosecutor is "bargaining
with the potential defendant of a threatened indictment."'4
Litton's counsel attempted to distinguish Bordenkircher on the basis
that at the time of the plea negotiations in that case, the government had
probable cause to indict on the threatened charge. In contrast, the govern-
ment admittedly had no evidence of intent to defraud and hence no prob-
1 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
573 F.2d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 199.
'7 Id. No discussion exists in either opinion of the nature of any new evidence which the
government might have presented to the second grand jury. Obviously unpersuaded, the
district court noted only that the government "asserts" that new evidence of criminal intent
was developed. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 125, at A-4. The Fourth Circuit simply
mentioned in passing that "after new evidence of the defendant's wrongdoing has been uncov-
ered," the government should not be bound by a previously rejected offer. 573 F.2d at 200.
In fact, it appears that no new evidence was obtained and that the government simply
submitted in summary fashion the evidence obtained in the first grand jury investigation to
the second grand jury. Petition four certiorari, supra note 127, at A-10 to A-11.
"1 573 F.2d at 199. The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Bordenkircher seems at odds
with the clear limitation imposed by the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher:
To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do
is a due process violation of the most basic sort, . . . and for an agent of the State
to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on
his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional."
434 U.S. at 363.
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able cause to seek an indictment at the time of the discussions in Litton.
The Fourth Circuit rejected that distinction as "insignificant," and stated:
"We do not believe that the [Supreme] Court intended to confine plea
bargaining to those situations where the prosecutor possesses irrefutable
proof of the most serious crime for which a defendant is ultimately prose-
cuted.""'
The Fourth Circuit also dismissed Litton's contention that the prosecu-
tor's withdrawal of the offer demonstrated actual prosecutorial vindictive-
ness, thus rendering Bordenkircher inapplicable."' Finally, the court ruled
that Bordenkircher was not distinguishable "because it dealt solely with
criminal proceedings while this case presents a mixture of civil and crimi-
nal litigation." " ' In applying the principles expressed in Bordenkircher,
the court concluded that "the government did not abridge Litton's right
to substantive due process"P
52
The legerdemain of the Fourth Circuit in avoiding the limitations of the
Bordenkircher holding is remarkable. The court both cited Borden-
kircher as controlling authority and yet evaded its express requirement
of probable cause, which was essential to legitimatize the plea bargaining
process. Thus, the court in one breath relied on, and in the next ignored,
Bordenkircher's constitutional underpinnings. Moreover, the Fourth Cir-
cuit improperly equated the government's lack of proof of all elements of
the offense at the time of the negotiations with the situation posited in
"' 573 F.2d at 199. Once again, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation appears to conflict
with the actual language of the Supreme Court in Bordenki rcher:
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.
434 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added); see note 106 supra.
The Supreme Court impliedly prohibited the conduct by the Fourth Circuit when the
Court in Bordenkircher explained that the probable cause requirement had been met: "As a
practical matter, in short, this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes
as a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge as part of
the plea bargain." 434 U.S. at 360-61. The obvious difference between Litton and
Bordenkircher was that the grand jury could not have indicted the defendant on the falsifica-
tion charge since the prosecution had no evidence of intent. Thus, there was no probable
cause and the limited Bordenkircher exception had no application.
I" The court ruled that Bordenkircher "does not require a prosecutor to keep an offer of
a bargain open indefinitely after it has been rejected," suggesting that the discovery of new
evidence of the defendant's guilt was a proper basis of proceeding. 573 F.2d at 200. The court
did not state, however, that Litton presented an example of this rationale.
In addition, the court praised "[tihe prosecutor's candor in revealing the weakness of
the government's case," and concluded that this disclosure "dispels any notion of vindictive-
ness." Id. The Fourth Circuit did not analyze why an acknowledgement of an insufficient case
to take to the grand jury, coupled with the threat to indict if Litton did not forego its legal
rights, would dispel the appearance of vindictiveness within the meaning of Blackledge.
"I Id. Finding that the "material elements of both the civil and criminal proceedings
were closely interwoven," the court characterized the government's proposal as "an effort to
resolve all facets of an essentially single controversy." Id.
152 Id.
19791
374 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Blackledge, in which the prosecutor at the outset was unable to proceed
on a more serious charge because all the elements had not yet occurred.'
5 3
The court proceeded from that erroneous premise to find that the govern-
ment's acknowledged lack of proof of a necessary element demonstrated
commendable candor dispelling "any notion of vindictiveness."'
5 4
While it is true that the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher did not hold
that the prosecutor must have "irrefutable proof" to increase the charge,
the majority did require that the prosecutor have probable cause. 55 More-
over, the ABA and ALI Standards alluded to in Bordenkircher6 not only
require a prosecutor to have probable cause, but also condemn a prosecu-
tor's seeking to induce a plea of guilty where probable cause does not
exist.'57
'5 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974).
"1 573 F.2d at 200. The Court discounted evidence of actual vindictiveness contained in
the statement of an assistant United States attorney that "Litton brought this indictment."
Id. at 199 n.2. The Court found that the attorney was not trying the case and that there was
no evidence that he reflected the views of the Department of Justice. Id.
,5 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
"' See 434 U.S. at 365 n.9.
' ' Section 3.9(a) the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1971)
provides that: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when he knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause."
Section 350.3(3) of the ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) pro-
vides, in part, that:
The prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of guilty or nolo contendere by
exerting such undue pressures as: (a) charging or threatening to charge the defen-
dant with a crime not supported by facts believed by the prosecutor to be provable
In addition, the Disciplinary Rules of the American Bar Association provide: "A public
prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal
charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause."
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103(A).
In reviewing the ABA standards relating to probable cause, one commentator has con-
cluded:
The standard of probable cause does not require exacting judgment from the
prosecutor, for it does not entail great certainty concerning the underlying truth of
the matter; "probable cause" may be predicated on hearsay, and, indeed, does not
even import a substantial likelihood of guilt. Like probable cause, the prima facie
standard [for taking the case to trial] takes little account of credibility questions,
but it is a significantly more demanding criterion, satisified only by (1) "legal" (i.e.,
admissible) evidence (2) sufficiently complete to establish every element of the
crime in question, credence aside. So the standard countenances accusation on no
greater certitude than the belief warranting arrest (probable cause), but the prose-
cutor should not "overcharge," that is, he should not accuse of more than he
reasonably anticipates he will be able to support with legally sufficient evidence.
Read together, then, the trio of provisions sounds like this: The prosecutor must
abjure prosecution without probable cause, should refuse to charge without a dura-
ble prima facie case, and may decline to proceed if the evidence fails to satisfy him
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA,
71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1156 (1973).
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In addition to the Fourth Circuit's confusion on the probable cause
issue, the court erred in its discussion of constitutional due process.
Bordenkircher expressly reaffirmed the principle that, other than in the
plea bargaining context, punishment of a person who does what the law
permits is a "due process violation of the most basic sort. . . and for an
agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize
a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional."' ' 18 The
government's suggestion that Litton either permit the reopening of the
civil side of the dispute or face the prospect of indictment was in fact an
ultimatum: yield the right to the $16 million award or be indicted.' 5 When
Litton refused to yield to this demand, it became a victim of precisely the
type of due process violation condemned in Bordenkircher.'e
In addition to the due process issues, Litton presented a mixture of both
civil and criminal litigation between the parties, while Bordenkircher had
involved only criminal charges. The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the
two cases should not be distinguished on that basis led to yet another error.
The court found that the prosecutor's proposal "was an effort to resolve
all facets of an essentially single controversy."' 6 ' In doing so, it plainly
ignored the ethical prohibition against utilizing the criminal process to
gain an advantage in a civil action."
What credence or authority other courts will give to the Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding is, of course, unknown. As a practical matter, there is little
likelihood that an analogous factual situation will arise again. However,
" 434 U.s. at 363. Absent probable cause to indict, the Fourth Circuit's underlying
premise, that this offer was, in essence, a plea bargain, is itself highly suspect.
'"' See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
10 In United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit held that
where "the government sought unilaterally and vindictively to punish the appellant for asser-
tion of his legal rights [other than the right to plead not guilty], Bordenkircher is a support
rather than a bar" to condemnation of that action. Id. at 455.
The district court's decision in Litton properly pointed out that the normal "give and
take" of plea bargaining and the concomitant "mutuality of advantage" which were central
to the holding in Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363, were absent in Litton. "The 'bargaining'
was hardly at arm's-length. With a grand jury investigation in the background the
United States enjoyed substantial leverage in making its proposal." Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 127, at A-6 n.2.
"' 573 F.2d at 200.
, The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-105(A), states: "A lawyer shall
not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain
an advantage in a civil matter." Accord, MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); see Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 711-14 (4th Cir. 1967).
In addition, Ethical Canon 7-21 provides:
The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of dis-
putes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of
society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce
adjustment of private civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that process;
further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused may be de-
terred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in
settling private disputes is impaired ....
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC-21.
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since Litton is one of the few appellate decisions on prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness where the losing party has petitioned for certiorari, and since the
Supreme Court denied review, other courts may unfortunately regard
Litton as something other than what it is: an aberration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the reported federal decisions are less than uniform in their
application of the rationales of Pearce, Blackledge, and Bordenkircher,
some general principles applicable to motions to dismiss based on prosecu-
torial misconduct may be derived. First, to punish a person because he has
done what the law permits is a fundamental violation of due process.' 3
Second, both actual vindictiveness and the appearance of vindictiveness
by a prosecutor towards a defendant who has exercised his rights are pro-
hibited by the due process clause. 6 '
The due process violations in Pearce and Blackledge arose not from the
possibility that the defendants might be deterred from asserting their
rights, but from the possibility that the prosecutors might be retaliating
against that assertion.' 5 Due process prevents a prosecutor from increasing
or threatening to increase, charges after a defendant exercises a constitu-
tional, statutory or common law right. The prophylactic rule which bars
the prosecutor from bringing the new or increased charge is designed not
only to succor the defendant who may have asserted his rights, but also to
prevent a chilling of the exercise of such rights by other defendants in
similar circumstances.' 6
While reaffirming the holdings of Pearce and Blackledge, the Supreme
Court in Bordenkircher carved out a relatively narrow exception to the
Pearce/Blackledge rule. In good faith plea bargaining negotiations, where
the defendant is represented by counsel, the prosecutor is permitted to
offer the defendant the alternatives of pleading guilty to a lesser charge or
going to trial on a greater charge which the prosecutor then has probable
cause to file. '67 Outside of the plea bargaining situation, the due process
clause guards against the danger that the prosecutor might retaliate
against the accused for the exercise of his rights. When a prosecutor "ups
the ante" after a defendant exercises his rights, proof of bad faith by the
prosecutor is not required to sustain the defendant's claim of vindictive-
ness.'
The validity of the Pearce/Blackledge rule remains unimpaired in the
aftermath of Bordenkircher. The focus remains on the appearance of vind-
ictiveness, and the government bears the burden of affirmatively demon-
strating that there was a proper basis for the institution of additional
" Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
"' Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974).
" 434 U.S. at 362. But see 417 U.S. at 28.
,u See United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977).
,6? 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
,6 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
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charges. Only in the narrow area of plea bargaining has an exception been
created. Moreover, Bordenkircher conditions such an exception on four
criteria: first, the prosecutor must openly present the defendant with the
choice, accurately portrayed; second, the prosecutor must have probable
cause at that time to seek the additional charge; third, .the offer must relate
only to the defendant and not involve a third party; and finally, the prose-
cutor cannot employ race, religion or other arbitrary classifications in se-
lecting what charges to bring against a defendant."6 9 Only when all four
criteria are met does the Bordenkircher exception apply.
Any attempt by the government to invoke Bordenkircher must be care-
fully scrutinized, for it is often raised as an excuse when it is factually
inappropriate. 170 The failure to apply the qualifying criteria of
Bordenkircher led the Fourth Circuit into error in United States v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 7 and the fundamental nature of that error strongly necessi-
tates a narrow construction of the Bordenkircher exception.
Even when a case appears to fall within the Bordenkircher exception,
it is incumbent upon the courts to examine not simply the due process
concerns relating to the defendant, but also whether the prosecutor has
lived up to those ethical responsibilities which go with his extensive au-
thority. The courts must exercise their supervisory powers to control prose-
cutorial overreaching which does not stretch far enough to transgress con-
stitutional limits.' Only in this way can the due process concerns reflected
in the Pearce/Blackledge rule be safeguarded.
1, 434 U.S. at 364; see text accompanying notes 105-08 supra.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-44 (E.D.Mich. 1978).
171 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978).
"7 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
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